1 edition of The bargaining problem without convexity found in the catalog.
by College of Commerce and Business Administration, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in [Urbana, Ill.]
Written in English
Includes bibliographical references (p.18).
|Statement||John P. Conley and Simon Wilkie|
|Series||BEBR faculty working paper -- no. 89-1620, BEBR faculty working paper -- no. 89-1620.|
|Contributions||Wilkie, Simon, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. College of Commerce and Business Administration|
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||18 p. :|
|Number of Pages||18|
John P. Conley and Simon Wilkie (), 'The Bargaining Problem Without Convexity: Extending the Egalitarian and Kalai-Smorodinksy Solutions' Lin Zhou (), 'The Nash Bargaining Theory with Non-Convex Problems'PART II UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF THE DISAGREEMENT POINT A Monotonocity The bargaining game. The Nash bargaining solution is the unique solution to a two-person bargaining problem that satisfies the axioms of scale invariance, symmetry, efficiency, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. According to Walker, Nash's bargaining solution was shown by John Harsanyi to be the same as Zeuthen's solution of the bargaining problem.
"An Equitable Nash Solution to Nonconvex Bargaining Problems," Discussion Paper Series , Institute of Economic Research ," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Experiments in Economics vol. 77(3), pages , October. Zambrano, Eduardo, "‘Vintage’ Nash bargaining without convexity," Economics Letters, Elsevier. present single-valued extensions of the Nash solution to non-convex pure bargaining problems. Without convexity, it is di cult to maintain single-valuedness: closer to our work are Kaneko , and especially Maschler, Owen and Peleg  and Herrero , who allow set-valued solutions.
An Axiomatization of the Nash Bargaining Solution Geoﬀroy de Clippel1 November 9, Abstract I prove that the Nash bargaining solution is the only solution to satisfy ‘Disagreement Point Convexity’ and ‘Midpoint Domination’. I explain how this improves previous results obtained by Chun () and by Dagan et al. (). 1 Introduction. This paper studies the Nash solution to non-convex bargaining problems. Given the multiplicity of the Nash solution in this context, we refine the Nash solution by incorporating an equity consideration. The proposed refinement is defined as the composition of the Nash solution and a variant of the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution. We then present an axiomatic .
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Vol Issue 4, AugustPages The bargaining problem without convexity: Extending the egalitarian and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions Cited by: bargainingsolutionF,definedonaclassofproblemsEn is a map thatassociates with each problem (S,d) £ S n a unique point theaxiomatic approach to bargaining.
Economics Letters 36 () North-Holland The bargaining problem without convexity Extending the egalitarian and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions John P.
Conley University of Illinois, Champaign, ILUSA Simon Wilkie Bell Communications Research, Morristown, NJUSA Received 25 February Accepted 1 May We relax the assumption used in axiomatic bargaining Cited by: bargainingsolutionF,definedonaclassofproblemsSn, is a map that associates with each problem (5,d) £ S n a unique point theaxiomatic approach to bargaining.
"Alternative characterizations of three bargaining solutions for nonconvex problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pagesOctober. Yongsheng Xu & Naoki Yoshihara, " An equitable Nash solution to nonconvex bargaining problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol.
48(3. We introduce log-convexity for bargaining problems. With the requirement of some basic regularity conditions, log-convexity is shown to be necessary and sufficient for.
Hans Peters & Dries Vermeulen, "WPO, COV and IIA bargaining solutions for non-convex bargaining problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(4), pagesSerra, "Bargaining for bribes under uncertainty," CSAE Working Paper SeriesCentre for the Study of African.
I consider the usual bargaining problem (U, d), where U ⊂ ℜ I is the utility possibility set, I denotes the number of agents and d ∈ U is the disagreement point. Let f (U, d) ⊆ U be a candidate solution to bargaining problem (U, d).
U is compact but need not be convex. It can even contain only finitely many points. Economics Letters 33 () North-Holland BARGAINING WITHOUT CONVEXITY Generalizing the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution T.C.A. ANANT and Badal MUKHERJI Dehli School of Economics, DehliIndia Kaushik BASU Princeton University, Princeton, NJUSA Received 18 September Accepted 23 October It is.
The paper investigates axiomatic bargaining in non-convex settings. • An axiom dubbed ‘Preference for symmetry’ replaces Nash’s original ‘Symmetry’ axiom.
• ‘Preference for symmetry’ collapses to the Symmetry axiom in convex settings. • The rest of the axioms are as in Nash’s original paper. The bargaining problem without convexity: Extending the egalitarian and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions Article (PDF Available) in Economics Letters 36(4).
"Implementing the nash extension bargaining solution for non-convex problems," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pagesDecember. Kaushik Basu, " Bargaining with set-valued disagreement," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol.
13(1), pages We introduce log-convexity for bargaining problems. With the requirement of some basic regularity conditions, log-convexity is shown to be necessary and sufficient for Nash’s axioms to determine a unique single-valued bargaining solution up to choices of bargaining powers.
Specifically, we show that the single-valued (asymmetric) Nash solution is the unique solution. PDF | On Jan 1,John P. Conley and others published The Nash bargaining problem without convexity / | Find, read and cite all the research you need on ResearchGate.
Request PDF | Nash Bargaining without Convexity | In this note I study Nash bargaining when the utility possibility set of the bargaining problem is non-convex.
A simple variation of Nash's. Zvi Safra and Dov Samet (), ‘An Ordinal Solution to Bargaining Problems with Many Players’ E Non-convex Problems John P. Conley and Simon Wilkie (), ‘The Bargaining Problem Without Convexity: Extending the Egalitarian and Kalai-Smorodinksy Solutions’ Lin Zhou (), ‘The Nash Bargaining Theory with Non-Convex.
C.-Z. Qin et al. Keywords Bargaining problem Non-convexity Log-convexity Nash solution Nash product JEL Classiﬁcation C78 D21 D43 1 Introduction The bargaining theory introduced in the seminal papers of Nash (, ) postu.
We completely characterize a class of bargaining problems allowing for non-convexity, on which three of Nash axioms uniquely characterize the Nash bargaining solution up to specifications of.
bargaining problems, but their motivations and conclusions are quite different from mine. THE THEOREM An n-person bargaining problem is a pair (S, d) in which S is a subset of R" that is closed, comprehensive, and bounded from above, and d an interior point of S.
Let. denote the collection of all such bargaining problems. John P. Conley and Simon Wilkie, “The Bargaining Problem without Convexity: Extending the Egalitarian and Kalai-Smorodinsky Solutions” () Economics Letters, Vol.
36, pp. (Reprinted in Bargaining And The Theory Of Cooperative Games: John Nash And Beyond, Edited by William Thomson, and Elmer B.
Milliman, Edmond Elger, ). Convexity is a risk-management tool, used to measure and manage a portfolio's exposure to market risk. Convexity is a measure of the curvature in the relationship between bond prices and bond yields.Bargaining and the Theory of Cooperative Games: John Nash and Beyond by William L.
Thomson,available at Book Depository with free delivery worldwide. In this note I study Nash bargaining when the utility possibility set of the bargaining problem is not-convex. A simple variation of Nash's Symmetry axiom is all that is necessary to establish a set-valued version of Nash's solution in non-convex settings.
'Vintage' Nash Bargaining Without Convexity (Octo ). Available at SSRN.